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Abstract: The Brazilian Forest Code restricts landowners’ uses of the land. Changes in 
property rights are therefore the core element of the program. In this paper the new 
institutional literature on property rights is used to analyze the main difficulties involved 
in such a re-specification of rights. Four concepts from this literature are described and 
applied to better understand the issues that have hindered the program in the past and 
that affect the current version of the program initiated in 2012: (i) property rights as a 
‘bundle of rights’, (ii) evolution of property rights, (iii) path dependence; and Ostrom’s 
8 design principles. The paper argues that the key issue for the Forest Code is the level 
of uncertainty of the gap between the de jure and de facto specification of property rights.
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Resumo: A essência do Código Florestal brasileiro é uma alteração nos direitos de propriedade que 
restringem os usos que os proprietários podem fazer da terra. Neste trabalho, a literatura da nova 
economia das instituições relacionada à direitos de propriedade é usada para analisar as dificuldades 
e problemas envolvidos em uma reespecificação de direitos de propriedade desta natureza. Quatro 
conceitos desta literatura são descritos e aplicados para entender os problemas que o Código Florestal 
tem encontrado e que certamente irão persistir na nova versão do programa iniciada em 2012: (i) 
direitos de propriedade como um feixe de direitos (bundle of rights), (ii) evolução de direitos de 
propriedade, (iii) dependência da trajetória (path dependence) e (iv) 8 princípios para governança 
de Elinor Ostrom. O trabalho argumenta que a principal questão para o funcionamento do Código 
Florestal é o nível de incerteza relacionado ao hiato entre as especificações de jure e de facto dos 
direitos de propriedade.
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1. Introduction
In 2012 Brazil revised its Forest Code legislation 
which regulates private land use and management 
by mandating landowners to set aside in native 
vegetation and leave unused an area equal to 20% of 
total property area (80% in the Amazon). The Forest 
Code was initially established in 1934 to promote fuel 
conservation, was reformulated in 1965 to promote the 
economic development of forest based industry, but 
since the mid 1990’s has become as an environmental 
law (HIRAKURI, 2003). Until recently government 
had failed to effectively enforce the Forest Code, as 
neither the political consensus nor the administrative 
capabilities seemed to be in place. The recent revision 
of the legislation, however, indicates that both of these 
circumstances are changing and that a more realistic 
effort at actually implementing the Forest Code will 
be made this time. If this does in fact prove to be the 
case, this might be Brazil’s grand policy experiment in 
the area of property rights. It is a grand experiment 
because the size of the country makes the area and 
population involved reach continental proportions. 
Other Brazilian policies that involved intervening 
directly with individuals’ property rights, such as the 
land reform program or the occupation of the Amazon, 
pale in comparison in terms of magnitude and reach, 
as they did not apply to all or even most properties 
in the country. And as those policy experiences have 
shown, interventions that require altering property 
rights tend not to be as straightforward as they can 
initially seem, often eliciting unexpected behavior and 
yielding unintended consequences. These difficulties 
are compounded by the fact that the Forest Code 
legislation is one of the most draconian land laws in 
the world, requiring landowners to set aside significant 
fractions of their properties, with non-trivial impacts in 
terms of foregone production possibilities and reduced 
rental streams that must be fully absorbed by the 
owners without compensation. On the other hand, it 
is precisely because of its massive magnitude, depth 
and coverage that the Forest Code has the potential to 
really have a profound positive environmental impact 
(SOARES-FILHO et al., 2014; CHIVARI and LOPES, 
2015). The purpose of this paper is to assess how the 
nature of property rights to land in Brazil will affect the 
implementation of the Forest Code and the realization 
of the potential positive environmental impacts. This 
involves analyzing the historical evolution of property 
rights in Brazil and an institutional analysis of how 
property rights affect the incentives and behavior.
In the past two decades, there has come to be 
a consensus in the academic literature about the 
fundamental role played by institutions – as rule 
of the game – and property rights in determining 
economic decisions and outcomes (NORTH et al., 2009; 
ACEMOGLU and ROBINSON, 2012). Secure and well 
defined property rights are widely recognized as crucial 
inputs for investment, development of markets, better 
use of resources and economic growth. But whereas 
this recognition is widespread, the notion of property 
rights that is used is often highly simplified. Property 
rights are often seen as a one-dimensional concept 
that can be either ‘secure’ or ‘insecure’, or possibly put 
into an index that varies from zero to one to be used in 
cross-country regressions. Whereas such an approach 
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can be useful for the type of questions addressed 
in cross-country comparisons, when it comes to 
understanding how individuals’ and groups’ choices 
and behavior are affected when using a resource such 
as land, a more rigorous understanding of the property 
rights is necessary. Property rights are not a relation 
between an individual and a thing, such as land, but 
rather a relation between different individuals related 
to the use of a thing. This means that a property right 
specifies a list of abilities and restrictions that apply 
to both the owner and to other members of society 
(BARZEL, 1997). Furthermore, property rights are 
not a single blanket right that covers every aspect of 
the property, rather it is composed of many different 
dimensions each or which refers to different attributes. 
For example, a property right to a piece of land might 
give the holder the right to sell, lease, subdivide, and 
fence the property, while giving a neighbor the right 
to cross, to pursue hunted animals and to be free from 
noxious odors emanating from the property, while 
society retains the rights to subsoil minerals, to tax and 
to regulate the property. The Forest Code is essentially 
a re-specification of property rights that limits 
landowners’ right to clear all of their land and confers 
to society the right to the environmental benefits of 
having native vegetation on each piece of land. To 
further complicate matters, it is almost never possible 
or economically rational to fully enforce the formal 
property rights specified by laws and regulation so that 
the de facto property rights that provide the incentives 
for land use choices are generally disjoint from the de 
jure property rights on paper. This wedge between de 
jure and de facto may not be very consequential if there 
is wide agreement and certainty that what truly applies 
are the de facto rules that everybody has actually been 
abiding by. But when there is uncertainty whether 
the de facto rights will always prevail or whether the 
de jure rights might be invoked by other claimants or 
by the government, then there can arise incentives 
for unproductive, opportunistic and defensive 
behavior that can dissipate much of the land’s rental 
streams through suboptimal land use and suboptimal 
investment, as well as through conflict, violence and 
environmental degradation. This paper argues that 
one of the major challenges for the Forest Code has 
been and will continue to be the insecurity of property 
rights that emerges from the uncertainty between de 
jure and de facto rights.
Because property rights involve multiple 
dimensions and are difficult to enforce, it follows that 
both academic analysis and actual policymaking are 
often trickier than one might initially expect. For many 
years, experts had presumed that the only way to 
avoid the Tragedy of the Commons, where resources 
are over-used due to lack of clear ownership, was to 
resort to strong, clear property rights, either in the 
form of private property or state ownership (HARDIN, 
1968). The presumption was that in the absence of 
either of these solutions, prisoner dilemmas and 
problems of collective action would inevitably lead 
to the tragedy of the commons. And yet, as noted by 
Elinor Ostrom in her research on common property 
management of natural resources, small groups and 
communities across the world and throughout history 
have managed to establish governance mechanisms 
to use resources such as land, water, forests, pastures 
etc. in sustainable ways (OSTROM, 1990). Whereas 
this insight might seem obvious once it has been stated 
– and rewarded with a Nobel Prize in 2009 – it is still 
often ignored in the literature and in policymaking.
Another example of the elusive nature of property 
rights is the influential argument made by Hernando 
de Soto in “The Mystery of Capital” (SOTO, 2003) that 
that if the poor were granted title to the houses and 
land they possessed, they would access credit and 
enter the formal economy. This would allow the poor 
to leverage property into wealth and would allow 
poor countries to access the same kind of gains from 
capitalism that have been experienced by developed 
countries. This thesis became highly popular among 
politicians and policymakers in different countries 
and led to several programs to better define and 
secure property rights so as to unlock this potential. 
Without getting into the merit of such programs, it is 
noteworthy that even in de Soto’s prototypical case 
of urban slums in Lima, Peru, although the policy to 
strengthen property rights was found to have led to 
greater residential investment, this did not take place 
as expected through credit obtained by using the 
newly-titled property as collateral. Banks continued 
to withhold credit to the poor because they realized 
the political difficulty of foreclosing despite formal 
titles (once again an uncertainty between de jure and 
de facto rights). Instead, the improved investment was 
found to have been unexpectedly driven by the greater 
employment possibilities that arose once secure title 
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obviated the need for some family members to have 
to be constantly at the house to defend the property 
(FIELD, 2005).
Several other examples of the difficulty of 
reforming property rights could be mentioned, 
such as the mass collectivization of farmland in 
the Soviet Union and China; two other historical 
grand experiments with property rights. The point 
is that although the basic intuition that clear and 
secure property rights are crucial for good economic 
performance is correct, the way in which property 
rights affect incentives and behavior is complex and 
subtle, so that policy based on property rights has to 
carefully consider the specificities of the context and 
the nuances of how property rights work. This paper 
does exactly this for the case of property rights to land 
in Brazil and its implications for the Forest Code. The 
next section provides four concepts or insights from 
the economic theory of property rights that make it 
easier to understand the subtleties involved in specific 
cases. These analytical tools will then be used in the 
subsequent sections which turn to the Brazilian case. 
Section 3 then takes stock of the research on the impact 
of property rights to land in Brazil in order to establish 
what outcomes in terms of economic performance 
have been realized and how they were crucially 
impacted by property rights. Because many of these 
experiences have much in common with what is being 
pursued by the Forest Code, the cases that are analyzed 
hold many lessons and insights for this grand policy 
experiment. In particular, Section 4 details the process 
of land reform which has been continuously pursued 
in Brazil through many different programs since at 
least the mid-20th century. Many of the shortcoming of 
these land reform programs were related to property 
rights issues that can potentially impinge of the Forest 
Code program. Section 6 concludes on a positive note 
by pointing out some ways in which the Forest Code 
might be better positioned to succeed than any of the 
previous programs.
2. Four concepts to  
understand property rights
Given the multidimensional and dynamic nature 
of property rights it is useful to have some analytical 
tools in order to understand how they arise and how 
they impact economic agent’s choices and behavior. 
In this section, four concepts from the property rights 
literature are briefly presented, providing insights that 
will be used in subsequent sections to analyze property 
rights in Brazil.
2.1. Property as a bundle of rights
Legal scholars often use the metaphor of a ‘bundle 
of sticks’ to think about property rights, where each of 
the sticks in the bundle represents a specific attribute of 
the object.3 These attributes refer to the many different 
uses and actions that can be taken with the object. 
Because property is a relation among different agents 
with respect to an ‘object’, each of these attributes is an 
ability or a restriction on the owner or on the rest of 
society. Thus, the bundle of rights is a form of listing 
these abilities and restrictions for each of the potential 
uses of the object. A bundle of rights for a piece of 
land, for example, might allow the holder to plant, 
subdivide, fence, leave fallow etc., and grant society 
the right to tax, take in eminent domain, or require the 
presence of a legal reserve in native vegetation.
Figure 1 shows an example of a bundle of rights 
related to a piece of land. The bundle specifies which 
rights are held by the ‘owner’, and which are held 
by the state and by third parties. The usefulness of 
stating property rights in this way is that it makes 
explicit the incentives and constraints faced by the 
property holder given those specific property rights. 
The basic oversimplified notion that ‘good’ property 
rights are important for good economic performance 
becomes much more detailed and powerful when it 
is stated in terms of a bundle of rights that specifies 
each of the rights and shows each of the holders of 
those rights. The metaphor also makes it clear that 
the bundle can be assembled in many different ways 
by separating, combining, trading, and contracting 
the sticks in the bundle. Each combination of rights 
in the form of a bundle provides different incentives 
and constraints and thus lead to different outcomes 
and performance. A policy recommendation for a 
program such as the Forest Code involves finding 
a bundle of rights that simultaneously achieves the 
3. For a series of papers debating appropriateness of the 
bundle of rights metaphor see (KLEIN and ROBINSON, 
2011).
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Figure 1. Property as a bundle of rights
Owner’s bundle of rights
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Source: Created by the author.
sought after environmental protection together with 
productive use of the land, while providing incentives 
for compliance.
Figure 1 also shows that each of the sticks in the 
bundle are shorter than they could be. This reflects 
the fact that rights are never fully enforced, so that 
some of the rights are left in the public domain where 
they can be captured by others. Even if a State is 
present to protect property rights, the extent of the 
enforcement is always incomplete, as monitoring 
and policing is costly. Because of this, individuals also 
expend resources to enforce their property rights in 
addition to what is done by the state. Instead of relying 
completely on the state, for example, most people still 
lock their doors and even install security systems. But 
even here enforcement is never complete. Because 
enforcement is costly, individuals will only choose to 
expend resources securing their rights up to the point 
where the benefits from doing so are worth the cost. 
One could, for example, hire security guards to stand 
by your car when you park it on the street. But the 
added protection would probably not compensate 
the expected reduction in probability of the car being 
stolen, so it is rational to leave part of the right to the 
car in the public domain.
Because of the transaction costs of specifying and 
enforcing property rights it turns out that the bundle 
of rights that effectively constrains and incentivizes the 
players will often by considerably different than the 
formal property rights in the laws and regulations. That 
is, the de facto property rights can diverge significantly 
from the de jure property rights. This does not mean 
that the de jure rights are irrelevant or innocuous for 
they represent the expectation of how society, or those 
making the laws, envisioned the property rights as 
working. This means that even if the de jure property 
rights are not currently fully constraining, they could 
come to life in the future, as it is often easier start 
enforcing latent laws that have already been passed 
than it is to legislate completely new laws.
The key issue is the expectations of the players 
related to what bundle of rights they hold now and in 
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the future. To illustrate, start with a situation in which 
there is no uncertainty about the enforcement of the 
rights now or in the future, so that de jure and de facto 
rights are the same. Suppose additionally that the 
bundle of rights is constructed so as to induce ‘good’ 
outcomes for both the owner and society. If we now 
introduce some transaction costs so that there is a 
wedge between de jure and de facto rights, there might 
be some rent dissipation and inefficiencies relative to 
the prior situation. Some of the rights are now partially 
in the public domain where they can be captured 
by others and the holder might incur unproductive 
expenditures to protect those rights. But as long as 
there is reasonable certainty about what the rights are, 
a second-best situation will prevail where the de facto 
rights effectively determine incentives and constraints. 
In the Brazilian Forest Code, for example, there has 
long been a great divergence between de jure and de 
facto rights, where the law required the maintenance 
of a Forest Reserve in each property but because of 
lack of enforcement it was tacitly understood that 
one could fail to abide by this stipulation with little 
chance of triggering a sanction. But if something 
changes that cast doubt on whether it is the de jure or 
the de facto that will heretofore prevail, the uncertainty 
will upset the previous second-best incentives and 
might lead to greater distortions and rent dissipation. 
With the revision of the Forest Code and the revised 
commitment of the government to this time actually 
implement the program, there is now uncertainty 
as to where landowner’s property rights actually 
stand. The conditions for pushing forward with the 
program are stronger than they have ever been, with 
considerable support from society, social movements 
and the international community having generated 
considerable political will to move ahead. In addition, 
technological advances have made the logistical task 
of surveying, registering and monitoring properties 
and compliance easier and more efficient. And yet, 
even with these favorable forces the implementation 
of the program remains a formidable task. Different 
individuals will have different assessments of whether 
this time the program will effectively take off. This 
uncertainty makes it unclear whether the de facto or the 
de jure rights are the ones which should be acted upon, 
thus leading to unsecure property rights which impact 
individual’s behavior and economic performance. 
Sending a signal that de new de facto rights are the 
same as the de jure rights is crucial for the program’s 
success. But this is difficult to do because a credible 
signal requires actually implementing the program 
according to plan, while implementing the program 
depends on a large measure on the agent’s perception 
that the property rights have truly converged. The best 
way to achieve this credibility is to go ahead with the 
program as planned and by demonstration achieve 
a gradual deepening of beliefs that the rules have 
effectively changed.
2.2. The evolution of property rights
The discussion about property as a bundle of 
rights makes it clear that property rights are a dynamic 
concept, that is, they change over time. It is thus 
important to understand what determines that process 
of change. How do property rights first emerge and 
how do they evolve? A frontier can be thought of as a 
place or a situation where there is no scarcity of a given 
good and thus where property rights are either non-
existent or irrelevant if they exist. Because the good is 
abundant relative to demand, there is no competition 
for the good and the lack of property rights is innocuous, 
as it will not lead to conflict or rent dissipation. But if 
at some point a shock takes place that increases the 
demand for the resource, competition to appropriate 
it, conflict, violence and other forms of rent dissipation 
will arise. This increase in demand can come about due 
to a demographic, technological, preference, climatic, 
or other types of shocks, which brings in new potential 
appropriators, introducing scarcity in the place of 
abundance. Whereas before the change there was no 
need for formal property rights and competing claims 
could be mediated through norms, now there are 
many heterogeneous competitors and norms are no 
longer sufficient.
An influential thesis by Harold Demsetz suggests 
that at this point there arises a ‘demand’ for property 
right (DEMSETZ, 1967). The losses and inefficiencies 
inherent in a situation where property rights, or lack 
thereof, induce unproductive competition and rent 
dissipation would prompt the holders of the assets 
to seek to devise new property right that internalize 
externalities and eliminate the inefficiencies. His classic 
example are the Quebec Indians who prior to contact 
with Europeans appropriated beavers through an open 
access rule, first-come-first-serve. Given the size of the 
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population of beavers relative to the demand from 
the Indians, this was an ‘efficient’ rule which assured 
the productive and sustainable use of the resource. 
But once the demographic shock represented by the 
arrival of Europeans had opened the large-scale fur 
trade to the Indians, the former property right rule of 
open access was no longer ‘efficient’, as the increased 
competition for fur pushed the population of beavers 
towards its carrying capacity. According to Demsetz’s 
account the associated losses pushed the Indians to 
change the property rights to beavers to a system of 
private property, where different groups of beavers 
where assigned to specific individuals who could 
exclude others. By making each individual the residual 
claimant for his/her own set of animals there were 
incentives to internalize the externalities – a beaver 
not killed today would still be yours tomorrow – and 
‘efficiency’ was once again achieved.4
Demsetz’s theory of property rights evolution thus 
saw rights evolving optimally whenever the relative 
prices changed and the current rule no longer worked 
properly to provide incentives for ‘efficient’ resource 
use. Although very influential, this view was criticized 
for accounting only for the demand for property 
rights and simply assuming that a supply would 
automatically emerge.5 In most situation the supply of 
property rights is filtered through the existing political 
system and there is no guarantee that the new chosen 
property right rules will be those which are best for 
society. If the efficient rule under the new conditions 
is not in the interest of those who hold power, it will 
probably not be put in place, even if this implies social 
losses. Political transaction costs impede contracting 
away the inefficiencies so that property rights that 
promote inefficient behavior and rent dissipation may 
arise and persist. The prevalence of situations with 
these characteristics throughout history and across 
countries indicates that such outcomes are not at all 
unlikely.
The upshot from this discussion is that when 
circumstances change there are forces for property 
rights to change. Whenever the current bundle of rights 
4. For a more detailed analysis of the evolution of property 
rights see (ALSTON et al., 2012). For a Darwinian theory of 
property rights evolution see (ALSTON and MUELLER, 
2015). 
5. See (EGGERTSSON, 1990) for a critique of Demsetz’s 
theory.
is not inducing the best use of assets and resources there 
is space to try to improve incentives by adapting the 
property rights. But even if the design of a superior new 
bundle of rights is obvious to all, it will not necessarily 
be achieved, so that inefficient configurations can 
persist for long periods of time. Negotiation among 
stakeholders can help to move the rights towards 
more efficient designs, but political transaction costs 
can make it difficult to make the credible commitments 
that are typically required in this kind of intertemporal 
political transaction. The success of the Forest Code 
depends on this kind of transaction. There are clear 
gains to changing the current uncertain property right 
given the strong presence of externalities in terms of 
deforestation, carbon and biodiversity, as well as the 
lack of security for production and investment. The 
negotiation for this change takes place in a status quo 
in which each side’s willingness for exchange depends 
on their current endowment and the value today and 
hereafter of what they give up and what they receive. 
That is, the necessary political exchanges require 
consensually secure property rights. As suggested 
above, the best way of achieving this is to pursue the 
program in such a way to create through consistent 
action a gradual deepening of the belief in the new set 
of property rights.
2.3. Property rights and path dependence
Because property rights are difficult to change, 
even in the presence of clear gains to trade, it turns 
out that they are typically highly path dependent. 
Path dependence means that property rights tend to 
persist with the same design over long periods of time. 
It also means that the form taken by property rights are 
highly contingent to initial conditions when they first 
emerged. Both of these characteristics are illustrated 
by the comparison by Engerman and Sokoloff of 
the different colonization trajectories of countries 
that emerged from the discovery of the New World 
in the 15th century (SOKOLOFF and ENGERMAN, 
2000). They argue that where European colonizers 
encountered labor that could be coerced or imported 
(slavery) for the production of precious metals or 
large scale plantations, institution were put in place 
to enable that form of economic organization. These 
were extractive and coercive institutions that lead 
to high inequality of land and wealth, with power 
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concentrated in a small elite. This configuration of 
institutions naturally led to policies (i.e. educational, 
immigration, access to land, franchise, access to credit, 
judicial, etc.) that perpetuated the concentration and 
exclusion over time, thus the path dependence. On the 
other hand, colonies where there was no possibility 
of using coerced labor, such as the US and Canada, 
led to more inclusive institutions that gave rise to a 
more equal society. Here too path dependence meant 
that inclusive institutions produced inclusive policies 
that perpetuated the nature of open access societies. 
Because inclusive institutions are more conducive 
to economic growth and development over the long 
term than extractive institutions, it turned out that the 
colonies that started out producing greater wealth and 
activity eventually became poorer than those that were 
initially more impoverished, in a ‘reversal of fortune’ 
(ACEMOGLU et al., 2005).
The point here is to stress that although property 
rights evolve and can be changed, which was 
the message of the previous sub-section, history 
nevertheless matters and what can be achieved in 
designing property rights is highly contingent on how 
the current set of property rights and distribution of 
power were reached. Since the Forest Code was revived 
in the mid-1990’s it has been a highly controversial and 
disputed issue. In many ways, it is quite surprising 
that the Forest Code legislation has been so prominent 
in the country’s policymaking agenda. Many people 
assumed that because landowners are well-organized 
and well-represented in Congress, they could 
dominate the political debate regarding this issue. 
But if they were the single dominant interest, the 
Code would have been abandoned long ago. The fact 
that it has been persistently kept in the policymaking 
agenda indicates that there are also strong interests 
in favor of an effective implementation of the Forest 
Code, including environmental interest groups and 
voters. The fact that the most disputed votes in the 
2012 revision of the Code in Congress revolved around 
parametric details instead of the actual decision to 
pursue or not the policy, indicate that both sides are 
relatively well matched (ALSTON and MUELLER, 
2007). The balance of power between the different 
interests is a crucial determinant on what form the 
Forest Code will actually take as it gets implemented. 
Path dependence in a country with one of the highest 
levels of landownership concentration has made 
the evolution of Forest Code legislation slow and 
uncertain. But changes in Brazilian society’s beliefs 
and preferences show that though history matters, 
endowments are not fate.
2.4. Design principles of  
robust property rights institutions
The previous three points have argued that 
property rights are complex, multidimensional, 
possibly different from the de jure rules and are 
evolving but hard to change. What more practical 
lessons are there in property rights literature for the 
design and implementation of the Forest Code?
One of the most acclaimed approaches to 
understanding and designing property rights has been 
that of Elinor Ostrom who noted that small groups 
and communities throughout the world often defy 
the received wisdom that resources held in common 
property are inevitably fated to fall into the tragedy 
of the commons (OSTROM, 1990). Ostrom’s ‘Law’ 
proposes that “a resource arrangement that works 
in practice can work in theory” (FENNELL, 2011). 
This insight started a large literature that collected 
numerous cases related to all sorts of assets and 
resources, showing that these groups are frequently 
able to self-organize governance structures, that is 
bundles of rights, which can lead to sustainable uses of 
the resources. From the lessons learnt from this large 
catalogue of cases of successful and failed common 
property resource use, Ostrom distilled eight design 
principles of property rights institutions (OSTROM, 
1990, 2009). Design principles are not specific rules, 
but rather more abstract institutional regularities 
at a higher level of generality that are common to 
many instances of successful resource management. 
Although the Forest Code deals directly with private 
property and not common property resources, the 
environmental role of the Legal Reserves means that 
there is an important common property dimension, 
so these principles can still be helpful. Rather than 
listing the eight design principles, however, Table 
1 shows eight questions that translate the original 
principles into a form that is more directly relevant for 
a policymaker considering a specific policy.
Let us briefly see how some of these principles 
apply to the Forest Code. The first design principle 
requires the boundaries of the resource to be clearly 
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Table 1. Design principles for robust property rights institutions
1 How can we better define the boundaries of this resource and of the individuals who are authorized to use it so as to ensure 
clarity in who is authorized to harvest and where harvesting is authorized?
2 How can we improve the relationship between the benefits received and the contributions to the necessary costs of 
sustaining this system?
3 How can we enhance the participation of those involved in making key decisions about this system?
4 Who is monitoring this system, and do they face appropriate incentives given the challenge of monitoring?
5 What are the sanctions we are authorizing, and can they be adjusted so that someone who makes an error or a small rule 
infraction is warned sufficiently so as to ensure longer-term compliance without having to impose unrealistic sanctions?
6 What local and regional mechanisms exist to resolve conflicts arising over the use of a resource?
7 Are there functional and creative efforts by local appropriators to create effective stewardship mechanisms for local 
resources that should be recognized?
8 How do we create a multiple-layer, polycentric system that can be dynamic, adaptive, and effective over time?
Source: OSTROM (2009).
defined. For the Forest Code this refers not only to the 
boundary of the property itself, but also to the size 
and location of the legal reserve and other required 
protection areas, such as river banks and steep slopes. 
The lack of registries, cadasters and maps in Brazil 
has long been an obstacle to land-related policy, 
including earlier versions of the Forest Code. Yet new 
technologies have greatly improved capabilities in this 
area. This principle ratifies the importance of efforts to 
establish clear boundaries.
The second principle requires a proportionality 
equivalence between the benefits from the Forest 
Code and the costs imposed by the system. According 
to (OSTROM, 2009) this principle:
[…] relates to the likelihood that participants 
will feel that the rules they are using are 
equitable. If some people pay low costs but 
they get high benefits over time, this inequity 
is a matter of frustration for the participants 
and may lead to more and more participants 
refusing to abide by the rules because they are 
unfair. Thus, this design principle is directly 
related to the types of attitudes that are 
necessary to sustain a system over the long 
run. If some users get all the benefits and pay 
few of the costs, few of the others are willing 
to follow rules over time (OSTROM, 2009, 
p. 26)
In the case of the Forest Code this issue is a central 
part of the controversy. The legislation imposes all the 
costs of maintaining a legal reserve on the landowners. 
These are very significant costs, composed of the 
opportunity cost of land use and in many instances 
the cost of restoring the vegetation. The landowners 
feel that the de facto legislation never effectively 
required a legal reserve and that mandating this now 
amounts to a regulatory taking. On the other hand, 
environmentalists note that the de jure legislation has 
been in place for decades and argue that landowners 
have already benefited all this time from being able 
to evade these rules, so that it is fair to now require 
compliance. What the second principle suggests is that 
this divergence in perspective can be very damaging 
to the program’s success and warrants efforts to 
achieve some measure of consensus. In part, the efforts 
being made to reduce the costs of compliance, by for 
example allowing trading of forest reserve obligations 
from higher to lower opportunity cost land, serves the 
purpose of reducing the divergent incidence of costs 
and benefits.
These and other recommendations from the 
property rights literature that focus on institutions, 
power and context, can help design polices with 
greater prospects of achieving their goals.
3. Impacts of property rights on social 
and economic performance in Brazil
3.1. Property rights and performance in Brazil
A cursory look at the use of land in Brazil reveals 
signs of rampant rent dissipation in the form of 
conflict, violence, missing markets, suboptimal use, 
unsustainability, deforestation, missed opportunities 
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etc. This section examines which pathologies related to 
land use in Brazil have been linked to property rights 
and how they affect the implementation of the Forest 
Code.
The historical evolution to property rights to land 
in Brazil was such that by 20th century the norm was an 
extremely high concentration of landownership. The 
implication of this was that both in de jure and in de 
facto terms the rules for the allocation and use of land 
were fairly close, as both the laws and the physical 
reality privileged the landed elite. This state of affairs 
enabled a steady expansion of production and of 
the agricultural frontier after the Second World War, 
though at low levels of technology and productivity 
(MUELLER and MUELLER, 2014). However, gradually 
overtime there emerged in Brazilian society the 
belief that such extreme concentration of land and 
wealth was not desirable from an economic or a 
social justice perspective, and over the second half of 
the 20th century there were several punctuated and 
intermittent attempts to institute policies to counter 
this state of affairs. Many of these attempts got written 
into laws and even in constitutions. Most were of 
limited or no effect as they often implied redistribution 
from the powerful elites to poorly represented groups 
in society, so they became dead letters. Yet starting in 
1985, with re-democratization after two decades of 
military rule, the sentiment towards correcting the 
excessive concentration of land and wealth became a 
central belief in Brazilian society and not only induced 
more legislation imbued with this purpose, but also 
lead to greater success in having that legislation at 
least partially enforced.6 The 1988 Constitution was 
dominated by this sentiment and codified the belief in 
social inclusion. In many ways, the original document 
went too far in this other direction, contributing to the 
hyperinflation that followed, but over time many of the 
excesses of that document were revised and it has been 
an important instrument in the unprecedented fall in 
equality in Brazil from 1995 to the present (ALSTON 
et al., 2016).
This social change is important because it is the 
fundamental cause of what this paper has identified as 
the central problem of property right to land in Brazil: 
the divergence between de jure and de facto rights. In 
6. For a detailed analysis of this period of Brazilian history 
and the emergence of a belief in social inclusion, see 
Alston et al. (2016).
a first stage, as de jure rights started to incorporate 
rules that were contrary to the interest of the owners 
of land, the rules were simply ignored and the de facto 
reality prevailed. But as the belief in social inclusion 
became stronger, there was increasing pressure for 
the de jure rules to come into being and start to be 
implemented and enforced. Because the de facto rules 
have strong a constituency, a tension was created that 
led to increased uncertainty as to which was the actual 
status quo that now governed the allocation and use 
of land. This uncertainty resulted in rent dissipation 
and inefficiencies in the use and allocation of land. 
This section describes which impacts have been most 
pervasive in Brazil.
The clearest instance of this dynamic tension 
between de jure and de facto property rights to land 
described above can be seen in the institution of the 
notion of ‘the social function of property’ which 
appeared for the first time in the Land Statute of 1964 
and which remains today as the overarching set of 
principles that any land-related rule must follow. As 
expressed in Article 2 (and later reiterated in the 1988 
Constitution) the notion of the social function of land 
is as follows:
Article 2 The opportunity of access to 
ownership of land is secured to all, conditioned 
on its social function, as per this Law.
§ 1º The property of land fulfills its social 
function when it simultaneously:
a) promotes the welfare of the owners and the 
workers who toil in it, as well as their families;
b) maintains satisfactory levels of productivity;
c) assures the conservation of natural 
resources;
d) observes the laws governing fair working 
relationships between those who own and 
those who cultivate it.
This paper has identified five major pathologies 
related to land use and allocation in Brazil that are 
linked to the fact that the wedge between de jure and 
de facto property rights has become more severe as 
the demand for social inclusion has clashed with the 
prevailing distribution of wealth and power. Most 
of these pathologies can be described in terms of the 
requirement that land fulfill its social function as stated 
in the Land Statute and the Constitution. This does not 
mean that it is the legislation itself that is having this 
Bernardo Mueller
RESR, Piracicaba-SP, Vol. 56, Nº 02, p. 329-346, Abr./Jun. 2018 – Impressa em Julho de 2018
339
effect. Rather, the Constitution codifies the dominant 
belief in social inclusion and equality that has pervaded 
Brazilian society in the past decades. It is the belief that 
creates the wedge. By awakening old de jure rules and 
enabling new potentially effective property rights, the 
social function of land was simply one of the means 
through which the belief has been expressed.
3.2. Conflicts and violence
Perhaps the most direct and obvious consequence 
of uncertain property rights are land conflicts and 
violence. Every process of frontier evolution in Brazil 
has been accompanied by conflict and violence, 
from the coffee frontier in the 19th century described 
in Section 3.2, to the Amazon frontier starting in the 
1960s. As relative prices change the previous property 
rights are no longer suitable for handling the increased 
competition and conflict ensues. Although conflicts 
have always been present, starting in the early 
1990’s, the number of land related conflicts increased 
significantly in number and in prominence. Conflicts 
and violence are an obvious form of rent dissipation 
which indicate dysfunctional property rights, so why 
did this state of affairs become so prevalent?
This specific pathology is associated with the 
requirement in the ‘social function of property’ that 
land must ‘maintain satisfactory levels of productivity.’ 
This requirement has been the justification, since 
the Land Stature of 1964, for the choice of land 
reform through the expropriation of unproductive 
farms and transfer of the land to landless peasants 
that are expected to make it productive. Although 
the expropriation is compensated, in most cases it is 
punitive in the sense that it is imposed rather than 
negotiated, and can be below the original holder’s 
valuation of the land. This style of land reform is in 
contrast with milder forms, such as distribution of 
public land or land reform through taxation. On the 
other extreme, it is less punitive than land reform 
through uncompensated expropriation.
Both the military government (1964-1984) and the 
new democratic regime put in place extensive land 
reform programs. The first because of the perception 
that the vast idle latifundia were an important obstacle 
to the project of creating a great industrialized power. 
The second because of social justice. Land reform was 
one of the major banners of the New Republic and a 
symbol of the social inclusion it prioritized. Yet neither 
of these regimes managed to actually implement 
the programs they created with much fanfare. 
Land reform under any circumstances is a difficult 
policy to implement. It is even harder in a large and 
undeveloped country such as Brazil at that time. In 
a country where wealth and power are so unevenly 
distributed, redistribution proved almost impossible. 
So during this period, up to the early 1990’s, land 
reform was conspicuously present in the political 
debate and the policymaking scene, but had few 
practical results. In this period the disjuncture between 
de jure and de facto property rights was present, given 
this constant presence of land reform in daily life, but it 
was not too consequential given that the de facto reality 
clearly trumped the de jure aspirations. There were land 
conflicts at this time, but nothing like what is shown in 
Figure 2. But as the belief in social inclusion deepened 
in Brazilian society, the intent to make the de jure 
property rights prevail became increasingly stronger. 
The inclusion of the social function of property in the 
land reform section of the 1988 Constitution was by far 
the most controversial item of what was an intensely 
debated constitutional process (MUELLER, 1998).
These developments created the opportunity for 
well-organized peasants to increase their pressure for 
land reform. Led by the Landless Peasant Movement 
(MST – Movimento Sem Terra) the number of invasions 
of unproductive farms grew dramatically in the 1990’s. 
The MST realized that if they would wait for the 
government to follow through with its announced land 
reform programs, nothing would be accomplished. So 
they devised the strategy of invading land that fit the 
requirements for being expropriable (unproductive 
and/or weak title) as a means to force the government 
to expedite their efforts. Land reform in this period 
was fully driven by MST pressure, that is, land reform 
happened where they invaded. The intent was not 
to gain the land by sheer force. Instead the invasions 
where explicitly geared at exploiting the de jure rules 
that required ‘satisfactory levels of productivity.’ The 
violence and conflict that often ensued as the land 
owner or the police tried to remove the occupants from 
the land served the purpose of attracting attention 
of the urban electorate through the media which 
avidly covered these events. Urban voters in Brazil 
sympathize with land reform due to the belief in social 
inclusion that pervades society, as well as the mistaken 
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perception that land reform is merely redistributive 
and thus has no cost to them.7
The result of this state of affairs was that the 
government was compelled by the commotion raised 
by conflicts and violence to put in ever more effort 
and resources into land reform. This had the effect of 
strengthening the de jure rights but was not enough to 
make the de facto rights match the official rules. Thus 
the more effort the government made, the higher was 
the uncertainty of property rights and the greater 
the incentives for even more invasions and violence. 
This style of invasion-led land reform has resulted 
in a massive redistribution of land and resources to 
over one million needy families. It did not manage, 
however, to create a thriving substrate of productive 
family farms, as was the intention. The settlement 
projects that emerged from land reform at great 
expense in resources, environmental damage, violence 
and human suffering have rarely become independent 
and productive, with high levels of sales of plots and 
abandonment. Today Brazilian agriculture is still 
predominantly based on large mechanized farms and 
agribusinesses (MUELLER and MUELLER, 2012). By 
now this process has run most of its course and land 
reform has receded to the background, with few actual 
invasion of land, but rather other manifestations by the 
MST and other groups to expedite the release of credit 
and subsidies they are promised by the government. 
Thus, property rights to land in Brazil today may entail 
less uncertainty as regards conflicts and violence than 
they did in the past. But that is only after very huge 
rent dissipation has already taken place.8,9
3.3. Missing tenancy markets
Tenancy contracts, through which an owner rents 
out the use of the land to another agent in exchange 
for a fixed sum or a proportion of the production, 
7. For a game theoretic treatment of the institutionally deter-
mined nature of rural conflicts in Brazil see (ALSTON et 
al. 1999; ALSTON et al., 2000). For an analysis of the voter 
sympathy as the key driver of land reform see (ALSTON 
et al., 2010)
8. The lessons from these experiences for the Forest Code 
will be drawn out in Section 5.
9. For further evidence and analysis of rural conflicts in 
Brazil see (VERTOVA, 2006; ONDETTI, 2008; HIDALGO 
et al., 2010; BARROS et al., 2012; FETZER and MARDEN, 
2105)
have been prevalent throughout space and time. 
They can improve the allocation and use of resources 
by helping to allocate land to its highest valued uses 
and to deal with differential preferences for risk. In 
addition, tenancy can be a major instrument through 
which poor peasants with little experience can climb 
the agricultural ladder and achieve landownership. In 
a country such as Brazil, where there is an abundance 
of underused land together with large contingents of 
landless peasants, tenancy contracts would seem to be 
an ideal means to solve two problems at the same time. 
However, relative to most other countries Brazil seems 
to make remarkably low use of tenancy. Whereas in 
1995 less than 5% of the agricultural land was under 
tenancy contracts, in the US the comparable number 
was around 45% and in Belgium, France and Germany 
it was over 60% (DE JANVRY et al., 2002). What is it that 
is impeding economic agents of engaging in tenancy 
contracts that could yield such obvious gains?
Once again we can turn to the Land Statute to 
search for the codified expression of the forces that have 
blocked greater use of tenancy and sharecropping. 
Two of the conditions for the social function to be 
met are that arrangements (i) “promote the welfare 
of the owners and the workers who toil in it, as well 
as their families”, and (ii) “observe the laws governing 
fair working relationships between those who own 
the land those who cultivate it.” These requirements 
reflect a deep suspicion, not wholly unfounded 
historically, that tenancy relations involve exploitation 
of peasants by powerful landowners. In a context 
where land reform and expropriations are a central 
part of the political debate, the sentiment expressed 
by this legislation had the effect of inducing many 
landowners to avoid tenancy relations, even when 
they were profitable from a purely economic point of 
view. Conning and Robinson (2007) present a model 
where the economic organization of agriculture and 
the political equilibrium determining the distribution 
of property are jointly determined. Their main result 
captures well what has happened in Brazil:
[…] despite possible economic benefits of 
tenancy, each landlord acting individually 
may choose to defensively limit the extent 
of tenancy in order to limit the possible 
consequence of future property challenges to 
their property (p. 421).
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Alston and Mueller (2010) use agricultural census 
data for all municipalities in Brazil by 1996 and show 
that a one-standard deviation increase in conflicts in the 
previous 10 years decreases the incidence of fixed rent 
contracts from 4% to less than 3% and of sharecropping 
from 2.5% to 1.3%. In areas that have more conflicts 
land reform and the threat of expropriation is more 
salient, and thus the greater the risk to the owner of in 
entering tenancy contracts.10
3.4. Deforestation
Deforestation is the pathology due to insecure 
property rights that is most directly relevant for the 
Forest Code. Because forests are often remote and 
of difficult access, monitoring and enforcement of 
property rights is difficult, leading to great insecurity 
and uncertainty. There is a very large literature 
associating deforestation to dysfunctional property 
rights. Because of the Amazon, a large part of that 
literature is on Brazil. Some of these studies are: Mahar 
(1989); Binswanger (1991); Pfaff (1997); Alston et al., 
(1999); Alston et al., (2000); Margulis (2003); Acemoglu 
et al. (2005); Araujo Junior et al. (2008); Azevedos-
Ramos (2008); Puppim De Oliveira (2008); Araujo et al. 
(2009); Pacheco (2009); Corbera et al. (2011); Barros et 
al. (2012); Assunção et al. (2013); Sant’anna and Young 
(2014); Assunção et al. (2015) among many more.
Although it is difficult to separate what is 
deforestation caused by insecure property rights 
from other types of deforestation, e.g. because it is 
profitable, the evidence from this literature makes 
it clear that property rights are a major issue. One 
channel through which property rights may induce 
deforestation is due to the requirement of maintaining 
satisfactory levels of productivity in the Land Statute 
and the Constitution. Cleared forest often serves as 
evidence of productive use and thus makes the land 
less susceptible to expropriation for the purposes 
of land reform. It is true that the same legislation 
requires the land to ‘assure the conservation of natural 
resources’, but this contradiction in the legislation just 
increases uncertainty. With the land reform agency 
promoting productive use and the environmental 
10. Other papers analyzing the dearth of tenancy in Brazil 
are (BUAINAIN et al., 2008; ASSUNÇÃO and CHIAVARI, 
2014).
agency promoting conservation, it is often unclear 
for the landowner how to proceed, and the result 
has often been deforestation. In addition, clearing the 
forest makes invasions easier to detect and the property 
easier to protect. It is often noted that the forest is more 
valuable to society left standing than it is cut down, 
but given the difficulty of assigning the property rights 
to the different sticks in the bundle so that they can 
be negotiated, the result has often been to cut. Many 
schemes have sought to establish better incentives for 
more efficient use of the resources, such as the REDD+, 
and the central challenge there is precisely the issue of 
defining and ascertaining property rights.
The literature cited above has identified many 
other channels through which property rights 
influence deforestation and these will not be detailed 
here. The point to be stressed is that poorly defined 
property rights have been a central determinant of 
deforestation in the Amazon and elsewhere, and 
through very similar mechanisms they will be crucial 
for Forest Code policy.
3.5. Distortion of investment decisions  
and crop choices
When property rights are not secure many 
choices related to the use of the land may be distorted 
beyond what they would be under purely economic 
considerations. It is difficult to gauge the overall extent 
of rent dissipation due to these distortions, but several 
papers provide evidence for specific cases. Alston 
et al. (1996) find evidence of reduced land-specific 
investment as a response to weak titles in the Pará 
and Paraná frontiers. Vertova (2006) uses county-level 
data for Brazil to find evidence of sub-optimally large 
or premature investment as a means to strengthen 
insecure property rights. Bowser and Nelson (2012) 
find that land titles to low-income Afro-Brazilian 
communities (quilombos) lead to greater levels of 
income and welfare through their effect on production 
and investment, yet that only 5% of these communities 
had formal land titles.
Crop choice has also been shown to have been 
skewed away from purely economic and agricultural 
considerations. Alston et al., (2010) find that in those 
counties were there are more conflicts, and thus less 
secure property rights, the choice of which crops are 
planted is affected. Each crop has different implications 
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for the risk of invasion and of expropriation. Natural 
pasture and unused land signal under-use of the land 
and hence increase the probability of the property 
being targeted for land reform. Many of the most 
valuable crops are temporary crops, such as soya (as 
opposed to permanent crops, such as coffee). Although 
a productive farm would not normally be subject to 
invasion or expropriation, a climate of insecurity in the 
region can nevertheless reduce investment. This study 
found that greater levels of conflicts had impacts at 
both the high and low intensity-of-use margins. A one-
standard deviation increase in conflicts reduced the 
area in natural pasture by 17%, of unused land by 3.7% 
and of temporary crops by 3.1%, with compensating 
increases in planted pasture of 11.3% and permanent 
crops of 7.3%. Because the exercise controls for other 
determinants of crop choice, the results suggest that 
insecure property rights are distorting crop choice 
decisions.
3.6. Inequality in production
Brazilian agriculture has always been highly 
concentrated. Yet, given the massive effort in land 
redistribution and in the official promotion of family 
farms in the past quarter century one would expect 
there to be at least a moderately well established and 
thriving stratum of small farms participating in the 
agricultural sector. But the data shows the shocking 
reality that less than 1% of the farms in Brazil generate 
more than half of the gross income, while the 66% less 
productive farms produce only 3.27% of the income 
(ALVES and ROCHA, 2010). This is such a highly 
skewed production profile that it suggests that much 
of the orientation of current Brazilian agricultural 
policy towards family farms may be by now a chimera.
Inequality is not a consequence of poorly defined 
property rights to land, but it is related in many ways. 
The belief in social inclusion, which has been argued to 
be the fundamental cause of the disjuncture between 
de jure and de facto property rights, is a direct aversion 
to inequality. The greater the level of inequality, the 
greater will be the reaction in terms of programs and 
policymaking to address this issue. This often leads to 
attempts to make the latent de jure rules and legislation 
come too life, which then increases the uncertainty 
of property rights leading to many of the pathologies 
noted above.
3.7. Other impacts
The consequences of insecure property rights 
to land discussed in this section are by no means 
a complete list of all the ways in which rents are 
dissipated and inefficiencies created due to the lack of 
better rules, norms, and institutions. Other examples 
are lobbying and rent-seeking expenses (ARAUJO 
JUNIOR et al., 2008; ONDETTI, 2008; ALSTON et al., 
2010; ALBERTUS et al., 2015), and human suffering 
(WOLFORD, 2010). Many other examples are sure to 
exist, and this is still an active area of research.
4. Lessons for the Forest Code
What lessons can be learnt from the pathologies 
described above for the implementation of the Forest 
Code program? Some useful insights can be gained 
by a comparison of land reform and the Forest Code. 
Both are large scale policies that involve interfering 
directly with landowners’ bundle of rights. While land 
reform removes from the owner the stick in the bundle 
relative to the right to leave the land unproductive, 
the Forest Code removes the right to cut down all of 
the vegetation. Although these requirements face 
in opposing directions they are nonetheless both 
constraints on the owner’s liberty to choose what to 
do with the land. As such they are both subject to 
many of the same forces. In the previous section it 
was suggested that although land reform in Brazil did 
manage to redistribute vast areas of land, the program 
nonetheless failed to reach its objective of generating a 
large class of productive family farms. Let us see why 
this happened and consider the implications for the 
Forest Code.
The previous section described how the key 
determinant of the success of land reform in 
distributing so much land was the belief in social 
inclusion that pervades Brazilian society together 
with the symbolism of land reform in the eyes of the 
electorate as the way to compensate for past wrongs. 
A 2006 survey, for example, which asked respondents 
which reform the government should pursue first, had 
land reform at the top of the list when the question was 
open-ended. When a list of reforms was pre-specified, 
land reform was in the top 3 choices of over 45% of 
respondents (ABRAMO, 2006). Such preoccupation 
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with land reform is remarkable in a country that is 80% 
urban and at a time when Brazilian agriculture was 
already one of the world’s most productive.
Given that there was so much political support 
for the program, that so many resources were actually 
spent on the program, and that so much was actually 
done in terms of transferring land to landless peasants, 
why did the program fail in its main objectives? Alston 
et al. (2010) argue that the high level of popular support 
and scrutiny of the land reform program might have 
actually been a hindrance rather than a facilitator. 
An ongoing political debate became established on 
whether the government was doing enough in terms 
of land reform. This debate was constantly in the media 
and had important electoral consequences. Typically, it 
revolved around the federal government’s claims to 
have settled a certain large number of families each 
year, and the denouncement by the opposition and by 
the MST that the government was not doing enough. 
Inevitably this debate ended up concentrating on a 
single metric: the number of families settled in land 
reform projects. The problem is that once a metric 
becomes the single measure of progress all sides have 
incentives to focus solely on that metric and to disregard 
other margins that are not observed but are crucial for 
the program’s success, such as whether the peasants 
who were being given land were actually settling on 
it and making it productive or whether they were 
living off subsidies or selling the land. Under pressure 
to meet next year’s ambitious targets the government 
had incentives to use cheaper frontier land (much of 
it in the Amazon) where the probability for settlers to 
thrive was much lower. The upshot was that the land 
reform program got deeply implemented along the 
one salient margin but was fatally under-implemented 
along several of the other crucial margins.
It is not clear whether the Forest Code is subject 
to the same sort of perverse incentives, but many of 
the same elements are present. Like land reform, 
the Forest Code is highly controversial and part of a 
public debate. There certainly is a large constituency 
that supports the program, though it is not clear if the 
issue is as deeply rooted in the electorate’s collective 
consciousness as land reform has been. If this support 
turns out to be a lasting electoral issue, there will 
be incentives for the government to try to extoll its 
accomplishments in terms of the number of farms 
brought into compliance or the area of forest reserve 
protected. Similarly, critics will point out shortcomings 
in those same margins. Yet the ultimate objectives 
of the program are things that are much harder to 
measure and to prove, that is, things such as carbon 
sequestration, protection of biodiversity, preservation 
of the soil and water. The example of land reform 
warns that there is a risk that the political dynamics of 
the Forest Code could introduce distortions into which 
objectives are ultimately pursued.
Lessons for the Forest Code can also be gleaned 
from another property rights-related area, the success 
at reducing deforestation in Brazil since 2004. In the 
early 2000’s almost nobody predicted that deforestation 
in the Amazon would start to subside at significant 
rates. The continual expansion of deforestation had 
always seemed impervious to all attempts to reverse 
the trends. Yet all the sudden the yearly statistics 
started turning up encouraging numbers. How was 
this achieved? Might similar strategies be helpful for 
the Forest Code, which is clearly a related policy? The 
jury is still out on exactly what were the forces that led 
to the happy outcomes in deforestation (and whether 
they are sustainable), and no attempt will be made 
here to settle this issue. Yet one interpretation will be 
highlighted, as it seems to point to some characteristics 
of the policies used that might be similarly effective in 
the case of the Forest Code. A typical reaction when 
confronted with the task of making a policy work is to 
suggest that the policymaker should simply put more 
political will, effort and resources to really enforce the 
rules. This is a very top-down approach and, as seen 
in the case of land reform, doesn’t always manage 
to deal with all the difficulties that can emerge. 
Economist (2013) provides an interpretation of the 
fall in deforestation in the Amazon that tells a very 
different type of story. This interpretation focuses 
on the simultaneous confluence of factors acting on 
deforestation, many of them at the local level. Although 
there is an important role played by the federal 
environmental agency, many other players are present 
in this story, mayors and governors facing competitive 
electoral pressure for conservation, national and 
international NGOs, a strong environmental sentiment 
and movements, independent public attorneys, a free 
and active press, companies constrained by corporate 
social responsibility not to purchase from farmers who 
deforest, among others. It would probably be a useful 
strategy for the Forest Code program to elicit a similar 
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local and dispersed set of forces rather than relying 
solely on centralized implementation.
5. Conclusions
This paper has cast the major problem faced by 
Forest Code legislation as the uncertainty regarding 
property rights to land. In particular, the problem lies 
in the stick in the bundle of rights that pertains to the 
right to cut the area known as the legal reserve of the 
property. De jure legislation places that stick in the 
hands of society, which has the right to the benefits 
that emanate from the standing vegetation (carbon 
sequestration, biodiversity etc.) Yet de facto property 
rights have been such that landowners have truly held 
that stick of the bundle, and many of them chose to 
cut down the corresponding area. The renewed effort 
to truly implement the Forest Code strengthens the 
de jure rights, but not enough to make de facto rights 
the same as what is in the legislation. The uncertainty 
that ensues can have perverse incentives leading to 
conflict, violence, deforestation, investment and crop 
choice distortions, among others. This suggests that a 
key objective of the new program should be to reduce 
that uncertainty by credibly signaling which rules will 
prevail.
If property rights were perfectly defined and 
transaction costs were negligible, then it really would 
not matter for the efficient use of the land who had the 
right to the legal reserve, the landowner or society, as it 
would always be possible and worthwhile to negotiate 
to reach the optimal allocation. This is an application 
of the most influential insight in the property rights 
literature, known as the Coase Theorem (COASE, 1960). 
If we accept that the efficient thing to do is to have a 
standing legal reserve in each property, then under the 
condition of the Coase Theorem (clear property rights 
and no transaction costs) either society has the right to 
the legal reserve and it is kept standing by the owner, 
or the owner has the right to the reserve and society 
compensates him/her for not cutting it down. Whoever 
has the property right has an impact on who bears the 
cost, but does not affect whether the legal reserve will 
be kept standing or not.
The point of the Coase Theorem is not that this 
desirable outcome will automatically be realized. On 
the contrary, the expectation is that property rights 
are generally ill-defined and insecure, and transaction 
costs typically make negotiations prohibitive. Under 
such real world circumstances the use of the resource 
that emerges will consequently not be the same 
efficient outcome of the idealized conditions. Who has 
the actual property right to the resource turns out to be 
truly consequential, not only for the determination of 
who incurs the costs, but also whether the legal reserve 
is kept standing. Brazilian legislation has decided 
that the property right to the legal reserve belongs to 
society. Thus, society has a right to expect landowners 
to leave a predetermined portion of their land in 
natural vegetation. This has been a disputed and 
controversial decision, but if we accept that this is what 
will prevail, then how should the Forest Code program 
be pursued so as to ensure the best use of the resource. 
The Coase Theorem suggests two important margins 
through which the implementation of the program 
could work to ensure its success: clear property rights 
and low transaction costs.
Clear property rights cannot simply be decreed; 
they have to be achieved through consistency of 
implementation of the rules. As the government 
consistently demonstrates that it will follow and 
uphold the legislation, not overstepping its bounds 
and not failing to punish those who deviate, in an 
impersonal way and without exceptions, the credibility 
of the program will emerge making de jure and de facto 
rules converge. Reducing transaction costs involves 
making it easier for all parties to reach negotiated 
alternatives that still meet the legislation but do so in a 
less costly way. The legislation and the implementation 
of the program have already started pursuing several 
means of facilitating these transactions, for example 
by allowing for owners of highly productive land 
to purchase a compensating legal reserve in less 
productive land. Such schemes not only make economic 
sense, but should also help to increase compliance. 
Although they have to be carefully managed, they can 
make the difference between the success and failure of 
Brazil’s grand policy experiment with property rights.
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